This year's decision theory tutorial will be given by Richard Pettigrew (Bristol).
Title: Decision theory in epistemology
Abstract: Traditionally, decision theory has been used to provide norms for action. However, recently, it has been adapted by epistemologists to provide norms for rational belief. In this setting, we treat epistemic states as the actions between which an agent must choose; we treat utility as epistemic utility, a measure of the purely epistemic value of being in a particular epistemic state given a particular state of the world; and we appeal to the general norms of decision theory (such as the maximization of expected utility) to justify particular norms governing epistemic states. In this tutorial, we will give a general introduction to decision theory before presenting the results so far obtained in this epistemic version of decision theory: these include arguments for Probabilism, the Principal Principle, Conditionalization, and Jeffrey Conditionalization, as well as putative solutions to the Sleeping Beauty problem.